1:Campbell E-5 (1954-1955)1964
EH14 Sarakatsani EH14
Zagori

474 of a shepherd showing favouritism to his own animals by guiding
233 them to patches of better pasture. At lambing time each family tries to keep a careful watch in case ewe lambs born to its own sheep are surreptitiously exchanged for unwanted males. A careful awareness of one another and a vigilant concern for family rights govern the attitudes of the partners.

474 The principle of joint action also covers the various items of
233 income and expenditure which concern the interests of the whole
451 stani. At the cheese-maker's hut the milk is measured and credited to the stani as whole; this is partly a matter of convenience but it also means that all the shepherds have a common interest that the milk yield of the whole stani is as high as possible. Similarly, cotton-cake which supplements the diet of
[691] the ewes is bought by the 'company' not the family. The stani is regularly involved in minor law-suits over grazing boundaries, damage to crops, and sometimes there are more serious
[695] legal disputes. The fines which have to be paid and the fees for the attendance or advice of lawyers where this is necessary, are met by the stani as a whole; as are the expenses of the tselingas when he makes a journey to the town where the merchants, lawyers, and officials have their offices. Twice a year before the spring and autumn migrations the tselingas sits down with the other heads of family to settle their accounts. After the total expenses of the stani have been agreed, each family pays its share in proportion to the size of its flocks.

474 The form of association in a 'company' is contractual. Each
675 family has a number of relatively clearly defined and specific obligations to the group. It will not go far beyond these obligations out of feelings of sentiment. Debts, for instance, are seldom
[425] allowed to accumulate between families in the same 'company'. Yet in the absence of formal legal sanctions contractual relations depend on a measure of confidence, a sentiment that is possible in this community only between those related by kinship or marriage.

474 In the table (see appendix I) which indicates the winter dis-
602 positions of the Neochori shepherds, two facts emerge about the composition of the winter co-operating groups. In all but one instance the nucleus of the 'company' is a group of brothers or, in one case, two pairs of brothers related as first cousins. A man prefers to co-operate with brothers. The confidence they

1:Campbell E-5 (1954-1955)1964
EH14 Sarakatsani EH14
Zagori

612 τὸ σόϊ) the Sarakatsani say. But a man's own feelings also prompt
476 him to give this help. Like the grace of God, which is expressed by the same word, such favours are generally without motive or conscious sense of calculation.

There are, however, other forms of assistance and co-operation between collaterals which make some demand on the material wealth of a kinsman and his family. This is no longer merely a matter of personal kinship solidarity, since it is the principle of parental obligation which guides a man in his conduct as trustee of the corporate resources of the family, human
[431] and material, under his control. He is not free to make gifts of money or animals to a kinsman in difficulties. Yet it is still
●[675] possible for the families of these men to help one another in situations which involve corporately owned resources, providing that the assistance or co-operation is on a contractual basis of strict accountability. And this, of course, is only possible because between kinsmen there are normally sentiments of confidence and trust. In this way kinsmen sometimes make modest money loans, pasture each other's animals for a consideration, and frequently join in the co-management of their flocks.

The history of the misfortunes of Vasili Arvanitis illustrates this distinction. In the spring of 1955 his winter pastures were flooded by the irrigation of adjoining fields and, as often happens in these conditions, his animals contracted liver-fluke. From a flock of 105 sheep only 63 survived, an entirely inadequate number to support a growing family of five children. Vasili has a first cousin, Spiros Tangas, a more fortunate Sarakatsanos with 450 animals and a small property in the winter pastures near
[489] Preveza. When Spiros learned of the difficulties of his cousin he at once left home and went by bus to Igoumenitsa, a day's
[662] journey away. There he visited an official of the Ministry of
[426] Agriculture, a friend who had baptized his youngest daughter,
[851] and asked him if he would try to arrange his cousin's application for a considerable loan from the Agricultural Bank. For such applications are sometimes delayed for many months because of the formalities of proof relating to the cause of the animals' death. The following day he made another bus journey of some hours to a small town where the Mayor was an animal dealer with whom he sometimes did business. The Mayor introduced him to a friend with a few acres of rough

/177 cont./

However, one must not believe that the system of succession annuls the principle of the revocation of the extended family head, in case he is incompetent. For, even if the successor to the old head is invested by the latter, the head of the individual families dismiss him if he proves incompetent and replace him with someone else who then also becomes the head of the Tséligato.

Moreover, as in the extended family, the participants in the Tséligato are required to obey the orders of the Tséligas, to work and to check on the management.

The principles according to which this entire mechanism functions are contained in the agreements reached among the participants--agreements constituting a bilateral covenant, the general conditions of which are:

The Tséligas is obliged:

--to protect the participants and their families;

--to carry out all commercial, administrative and other contacts with surrounding society;

--to rent the necessary pastures;

--to supervise the work within the Tséligato;

--to furnish each one with provisions and the various material objects which are indispensable to him, as well as the equipment for the livestock;

/178/--to manage the common enterprise of economic utilization of livestock and to keep the accounts.

In return the participants must:

--obey the Tséligas;

--cooperate closely with each other;

--perform the tasks entrusted to them;

--share the expenses of the common enterprise;

--finally, should the occasion arise, defend the Tséligato even at the risk of their lives.

/179 cont./

474 554 Finally, the Tséligas is personally responsible to all those who have carried on economic relations with him: merchants, suppliers, etc., belonging to surrounding society, However, in case of damage, [434] everybody participates: if the income drawn from production does not [432] suffice to meet the obligations of the Tséligato toward the outside, sheep are taken from the flocks of each one, always in proportion to the number of "heads," and are sold.

474 596 198 675 From this enumeration of mutual obligations it is easy to conclude that the system of socio-economic functioning of the extended family is not very different from that of the Tséligato. Even more, close observation shows that the second has grown out of the first, but that it has been adapted, as one might expect, to its special character. Thus in order to interpret the individual points of the convenant (execution and allocation of tasks, provisioning and distribution of provisions, sale of products, etc.) the Sarakatsani have recourse to customs pertaining to the life of the extended family, which provides a general frame of reference.

[538] A Sarakatsani adage which says that "the Tséligas acts like a true father of a family" corroborates what we have just said.

474 596 Nevertheless, the line of demarcation between the extended family and the Tséligato is to be found, it seems, in the difference of spirit peculiar to each of these groups: that of the first is permeated with what the blood ties mean to our herders, while that of the second rests on a rationale related in, the common interest.

474 675 Finally, a last point is worth keeping in mind. The agreements which the Tséligas reaches with the participants are valid for six months, hence for a single seasonal installation. Of course, they are renewable if the cooperation proves satisfactory to each of the parties.

474 554 The Way of Life Within the Framework of the Tséligato.

The Tséligas is the most important person of the cooperative.

/179 cont./

He is seldom personally involved in herding, and carries a staff much shorter than that of the other shepherds, a staff /180/ which is also a sign of his rank. Moreover, he is the only one who has a saddle horse.

His dress is more elaborate than that of his men and his hut is always situated in the center of the encampment and built on the highest point.

Generally, his hut has a fretzato (circular enclosure adjoining the hut and forming a court) in which he receives visitors and where the negotiations with merchants take place.

It is he who offers hospitality, not forgetting, however, to write down the expenditures as part of the general cost of the business.

Nothing happens in the Tsóligato that he is not advised of. However, his authority never gives him the right to interfere in questions concerning the private lives of the participants.

In the course of performing his functions, the Tsóligas may, if he wishes, consult the other men of the Tsóligato. Yet this almost never happens. There is only one situation in which he needs the opinion of the experienced shepherds; he inquires of them about the quality of the grass of different pastures meant for the various categories of livestock.

We see by this that the only case in which the opinion of the subjects of the Tsóligas might be expressed is in an essentially technical, and not in an administrative matter.

This exception is very characteristic of the status and prestige of the Tsóligas who must, above all, act with justice, objectivity, generosity, and prudence. Respected by all, he insures order and peace.

If one or another of the participants shows himself to be undesirable the Tsóligas can turn him out before the expiration of his contract, but after the mutual obligations have been settled.

/181 cont./

474 571 461 521 Because they remain in the camp, the women profit more than the men from the intensity of social relations within the Tséligato. In summer, if one is out walking, one can see them all together spinning while gossiping and watching the children, the young girls for their part mounting the warp or weaving while exchanging confidences and jokes or singing sublimely lyrical songs.

(889) In a corner, the old men, very dignified, smoke their pipes and criticize everybody.

(533) The distant sound of bells or shepherd flutes adds to this atmosphere, which evokes an idyll of Theocritus or a page from Hesiod.

474 132 233 But in winter the colors are less soft. When the north winds sting cruelly and snow or storms make the night diabolical, men and women must protect the flocks, above all the newborn lambs, the hope of the future, by running from one sheepfold to another, from one gorge to another, in a desperate contest with unleashed nature. It is at such moments that the Tséligato completely proves its effectiveness as a form of /182/ solidarity and collective action, and in particular as the only framework open to those who are isolated.

* * * *

474 596 The elements of the Tséligato are arranged hierarchically. At the head one finds the Tséligas and his family. Then the associated families and the isolated shepherds, on an equal footing. This is true from a contractual point of view; in actuality the families are hierarchically arranged according to their size in work force and flocks, the isolated shepherds occupying a subordinate place.

Of course, the principle of seniority and of division by sex plays the same role here as in the other social units, the hierarchy of individuals outside their respective families being rigorously prescribed at the Tséligato level.

(595) For its part, the process of obligation-compensation seen in the

/182 cont./

474 596 675 other forms of Sarakatsani group life manifests itself here in the same way: isolated shepherds and conjugal as well as extended families take on obligations to the Tséligato. The Tséligato in turn takes on obligations in favor of its constituent elements. The heads of families transfer to the Tséligato their economic functions having to do with the business of herding, and so forth. Compensation resides chiefly in the facts that have determined the creation of the Tséligato, which we enumerated at the beginning of this section.

474 182 Sociological Characterization of the Tséligato.

As a specific social group, the Tséligato is midway between the extended family and the economic cooperative.

From the family it has borrowed the moral attributes that go with a family herding enterprise. From the cooperative it has taken the contractual bond uniting its members. As a result, it is better equipped than the cooperative, for, in carrying out its functions, it can appeal to moral attributes in all cases where the contractual bond is insufficient. Likewise, it is more powerful than the family, for it is in a position to make people who are not related cooperate.

It is therefore, according to the Gurvitch group typology, (55)

[113) 55. See G. Gurvitch: La vocation, pp. 309-311.

an intermediate group between kinship and /183/ an economic affinity, of voluntary, permanent and supra-functional cooperation.

We will try to assess the role it plays in the life of our herders when we discuss the organized aspect of the latter.

619 SARAKATSANI SOCIETY AND THE SURROUNDING SOCIETY

[474) Sarakatsani society includes all the Sarakatsani. It is made up of all the Tséligatos and their subordinate group or individual elements. It is created by their distribution in space. If we wish to use the criteria of classification in social groups proposed by G. Gurvitch and based on "the extent of dispersion," we should say that

/189 cont./
be denied. On the other hand, Sarakatsani society does not have such an organization.

As far as the families are concerned, their organization is to be found in the power of the father-head-manager or the head-manager in his responsibilities, in the functions, rights and obligations of the family members, in the hierarchy of sub-groups their functions, etc.

As for the Tséligato, its organization consists of agreements made between the participants; it is completed by that of the central family.

The administrative apparatus of surrounding society, finally, constitutes the organization of this society.

The relations between these different organizations reflect the relationship between the corresponding units.

In all these instances one may note the constraint that the organization exerts on the corresponding group, as well as the constraint that one organization exerts on another, at least in part, starting with that of the surrounding society upon the Tséligato and the extended families, and that of the extended family upon the conjugal family.

This interplay is derived from conditions and regulations applicable to individuals or groups /190/ permanently established from which a person cannot stand apart with impunity and which dictate and inspire roles and conduct of individuals and groups.

The effect of the existence of organization among the purely Sarakatsani groups are very important. They are felt in connection with the efficient fulfillment of social or economic functions. If the Tséligato succeeds, as we have noted, in making its members cooperate whenever a family by itself would fail, this is due precisely to its organization. And if the extended family may be assured of smooth interior functioning despite the number, nature and oppostitions of its individual or group componenet, this is in large part due to its organization.

/207 cont./

671 593 [428] exception is quite understandable when one remembers that the inherited share forms the foundation for the future family of the inheritor and thus relates directly to the world of family values, to the world of the "family law."

In the second place, certain strict regulations demand formal application. The consent of the father to the betrothal and the marriage, or the legitimacy of his children must be manifested publicly and in accordance with a definite procedure, as we know. On the other hand, this solemnity and this formality are not demanded in other instances.

Rules of law relating to the Tséligato.

474 695 671 If one examines the possible content of the contract (described in Part III of the preceding chapter) which the participants make with the Tséligas, as well as all the rules bearing on its inner functioning, one may state:

First, that the contractual arrangements follow more informal rules. Custom is always there to guide the contracting parties and indicate to them the course to follow, the effectiveness of which time-honored experience guarantees.

Second, that the only rules which seem to be of a strict character are those which prescribe obedience to the head and solidarity among the participants (common defense against tresspassing and against all kinds of threats, etc.).

This distinction is justified. By definition economic relations demand a relatively flexible legal support in keeping with the nature of this kind of activity. On the other hand, the necessary homogeneity and safety of all demand absolute conformity to the corresponding rules.

However, neither in the first case nor in the second is formality demanded or a special form of expression of willingness required.

/208/ Finally, the contractual character of these relations leaves a great deal of leeway to individuals as sources of law, and to their

/208 cont./

474 675 671 initiative, which nonetheless develops in the context of Sarakatsani society and its cultural system.

The agents of ajudication, of sanction and coercion.

578 691 The elements of the problem: daily life and therefore all the questions relating to marriage, kinship and the functioning of the family, as well as the removal of the head, the checking of accounts of the family management and of the Tséligato, claims and quarrels between members and the Tséligas, the settling of various questions pertaining to guardianship, the division of an inheritance and so forth, create and represent numerous cases in which conflicts and litigations may arise.

578 627 692 691 Now all these questions must be solved one way or another. Though the agents of ajudication are multiple they are not always obvious. The same is true for the agents of sanction and coercion who are very often identical with the former.

In our effort to determine them we note first of all that the only official, hence visible tribunal that the Sarakatsani are acquainted with is that of arbiters.

[648] [179] Of course, an appeal to the official law of the surrounding society is always possible, but the Sarakatsani do not have recourse to it. (20)

20. This appeal would constitute a violation of the principle of isolation from the surrounding society, of which the Sarakatsani are very jealous.

691 692 219 [602] If the litigation concerns family questions and disagreements between members of the same family, the arbiters are recruited by the parties concerned from among the oldest relatives (uncles, for example).

[474] If the dispute is between strangers (members of the Tséligato and the head, for example), each of the parties proposes as arbiter one or two Tséligas.

The sentence, always binding and without appeal, from the viewpoint is formulated and pronounced according to what is good and fair to

/208 cont./
691 customary law on the one hand, and ex bono et aequo on the other,
692 according to circumstances and the case at hand.
629 /209/ However, the arbiters do not have any coercive powers.

Next come the family group, the Tséligato, finally surrounding society.

These groups do not form tribunals if one takes this term in its usual meaning in which the parties concerned present themselves, state their case and demand justice.

692 Nevertheless, these groups have real authority in disputes, their
627 opinion or their attitude with regard to the adversaries already con-
696 stituting a sentence. For their judgment, formulated either according to custom or spontaneously and according to the case at hand, is binding upon the person involved, inasmuch as they have means of constraint sufficient to enforce it.

It is precisely this fact which permits us to characterize these groups as agents of ajudication and to say that their opinion is a sentence.

Moreover, thay are actually empowered to execute the sentence of the arbiters.

627 Finally, in some disputes, the concerned individuals themselves may
696 make decisions and themselves apply the sanction.

The cases in which they intervene are not numerous. Custom designates the beneficiaries of this ajudication and the conditions under which they must exercise it. However, custom gives them a certain latitude in action. Thus:

404 First, the Tséligas may at any time annul his contract with one
695 of his participants and expel him forthwith if he believes the latter
627 has not properly fulfilled his obligations, In return, the participant
692 expelled may then resort to arbitration that will pronounce upon the
(686) "sufficient grounds" of this expulsion. This mechanism is much like what

/209 cont./

takes place between the commander of a ship and the members of his crew, according to maritime law. The special and comparable conditions of the life of the Tséligato and navigation on the high seas (21)

21. K. Karabida: 'Agroticha, pp. 39 and 47.

--a life full of diverse and unforeseeable dangers which must be faced as a group, without flinching and with the means at their disposal seem to have dictated this practice.

Second: The components of an extended family (small lineages, /210/ conjugal families, adult sons) may leave the home they share if they are satisfied with the loyality of their head.

Third: Potential participants can avoid joining a Tséligato whose head does not enjoy a good reputation.

In the first and second cases the sanction is almost inevitable since the danger of non-conformity by those responsible affects the entire community, whereas in the second and third cases it is more permissive, in view of the fact that the danger affects only sub-groups and individuals.

However, these remarks would not be complete if we did not mention the interventions of the family head or of the Tséligas to settle disputes among their subjects. These interventions sometimes take the form of arbitration, sometimes of influence through the prestige of these individuals; in both cases they are ultimately upheld by the community.

Nevertheless, in order to avoid the charge that these statements are based on "petito principii" we must now prove them objectively.

If we succeed in demonstrating that the sentences reached by arbitration, as well as the judgments and opinions of groups and individuals are obligatorily imposed on those concerned, and that the latter must conform to them without fail, we shall be demonstrating at the same time that the sentences, opinions and judgments have a legal character, that therefore they are true verdicts.

Moreover, if we prove that the arbiters, the groups and the individuals,

183 /399 cont./

578 In the second place, there is constraint in the general sense of
182 the term. It appears first in the influence of the Tséligas, the head,
626 who, to the extent that he has a strong personality and a true capacity
[494] to govern, is in a position to impose on his subjects the traditional
[554] norms by which the family group functions and thus to safeguard its
cohesion and its content /sic: "son conteny"/. Constraint manifests
[691] itself next in law and morality, the two aspects of group constraint
[577] which, armed with social support, act sovereignly in favor of the socio-
cultural status quo. The analysis of the way they are enforced has
demonstrated their effectiveness.

578 In the third place are the idealization and mythization of the
182 "Sarakatsani condition," the elevation to the rank of supreme value and
183 myth every cultural solution to each specific problem. No matter that
the application of these solutions, coldly considered, entails priva-
tions, concessions, and demands abnegation or sacrifice! In psychoanalytic
terms, one might call this phenomenon sublimation.

578 Religion for its part, with its teaching and traditions that
799 prescribe obedience to headmen, to elders, and justify the subordination
183 of the woman, while sanctioning the traditions by salvation, also supports
182 the social edifice by determining behavior and its motivation, that is
to say, by determining collective attitudes.

578 Finally, we encounter the mechanism of "obligation-compensation"
675 /400/ of which we have spoken above, (2)
182

2. See above, p. 205-206, etc.

and to which we should like to add some details--first of all terminolog-
[121] ically. The notion of alienation is taken here in its primitive and
legal meaning (Lalande) according to which alienatus is not free. Thus,
it is not identical with mental alienation or with alienation according

/400 cont./

to the Marxist theory, (3)

3. On the different meanings of the term alienation in Marx see: G. Gurvitch: La vocation, vol, II, pp. 253-258. although these have their origin in it. We use this term to indicate every case in which groups and individuals yield to other groups or other individuals all or part of their social or economic independence, their initiative, their activity, consciously or unconsciously, in the hope of obtaining in return a profit, a privilege, the recognition of certain rights, or more generally, some sort of satisfaction. [Eds. note: since this meaning of the word "alienation" would not be immediately apparent to readers of parts of the text in English in the Files, the term has been translated where used as "obligation"]. The term "compensation" designates exactly this counter-benefit and distinguishes it clearly from purely psychological compensation or psychoanalytic sublimation. Let us add further that compensation may be real, ideological or presumed, present or anticipated. It is not necessary that there be an absolute equivalence between the two terms. A relative equivalence suffices for this mechanism to bear fruit. Observation of societies shows that individuals and groups are mutually bound by manifold contributions of the obligation-compensation type which, in the final analysis, makes possible, up to a certain point, life in society. Of course, the nature, content, number, etc., of relations of this kind varies with the types of partial or whole societies and their structures. And if one wishes to analyze them, one will find that they reflect society as a whole, while being linked specifically with models, statuses, social roles, collective attitudes, ideas, values and mentalities. However, it would be erroneous to believe that the relationship "obligation-compensation" is a contractual relationship. It could be, but is not always, or rather is so

578 675 182 121 /400 cont./
only in limited cases. Finally, it is certain that all relationships of domination would degenerate into simple pressure relations (4)

4. On this distinction see G. Gurvitch: La Vocation, Vol. I, p. 222.

which in their turn would become situations of conflict if the mechanism "obligation-compensation" would not intervene to /401/ ensure at least a precarious equilibrium, provided that the total social phenomenon and social structure favor it.

578 675 182 183 121 In the case of the Sarakatsani, the mechanism in question enables individuals and groups not to consider their subordination as slavery pure and simple. For the principles of organization of their social life are oriented toward a strong integration of all elements, individuals or groups in a system where the maximum of socio-economic security is accorded to all. A sort of blueprint or secular and "primitive" control which determines each person's place in advance, permits him to benefit from a maximum of foresight. The main ideas that dominates Sarakatsani social organization and emanates from the value, of community is to ensure the destiny of each of its members. This represents the chief compensation of any subjugation, and we can now evaluate it according to its true nature. Moreover, the prerogatives of each person (man, woman, headman, participants), be they administrative, family, religious or magical prerogatives, neutralize the possible feelings of frustration which otherwise could make their appearance and be extremely virulent and disintegrating.

In short, the role of the "obligation-compensation" mechanism on behalf of equilibrium and a lack of schism proves fundamental. This is so obvious that it seems to us unnecessary to emphasize it. This mechanism provides not only the justification for the asymmetries in Sarakatsani

/401 cont./

508 society the "injustices and incompatibilities between norms and their
275 realization." according to the formula of Lévi-Strauss, but also the
182 means of overcoming them, and that in a constructive way.
183
121 As for the threats against the equilibrium arising from social units other than the family, we should like to emphasize that they are minor. The hostility of Sarakatsani society toward non-conformists
[626] exerts sufficient constraint to intimidate those who might possible violate the adopted socio-cultural models, this constraint consolidates
[177] both these models and the social equilibrium. Furthermore, since surrounding society is indifferent to the Sarakatsani who themselves insist on preserving their isolation, and does not interfere with their lives, it does not upset the equilibrium nor endanger its continuance. Or rather, that is what went on up to the last decades / "decennies?"/

* * * *

121 /402/ Nevertheless, other threats arise from one-dimensional
178 elements of Sarakatsani society, and present the possibility of changing
182 the latter.

In fact, if the technology or crafts, the organization of the family and the Tséligato, the economic system, law and morality, knowledge, magic or religion changed, they would bring about changes capable of loosening the general structure from top to bottom, given the close dialectical bonds existing between them.

However, this possibility is slight, for several reasons. First of all, because the change of one of these elements would encounter the resistance of all the others, precisely because of the dialectical link. In the second place, because all these elements are cultural solutions to concrete problems and their effectiveness has been demonstrated by experience. No one would agree to modify them in favor of a non-proven